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Abstract
From 2002–2004, the German government passed several laws that curtailed the generos-
ity of the unemployment compensation system. One of the most ambitious changes was a
considerable reduction in unemployment benefit entitlement lengths for older unemployed,
which was effective during 2006 and 2007. We apply a difference-in-differences approach
to show that the highly disputed reform induced a considerable decline in unemployment
incidence among older workers. It thus sealed an important leak in the unemployment in-
surance system. Furthermore, we find a strong anticipation effect; unemployment entries
of elderly workers peaked during the months preceding the reform.
Zusammenfassung
Das Gesetz zu Reformen am Arbeitsmarkt schränkte ab Februar 2006 die Bezugshöchst-
dauern des Arbeitslosengeldes für Ältere stark ein; je nach Altersgruppe um bis zu 14
Monate. Wir untersuchen dieses natürliche Experiment und zeigen: Bei den betroffenen
Altersgruppen stiegen die Übergangsraten aus Beschäftigung in Arbeitslosigkeit in den
drei Monaten vor der Reform deutlich an: Bei einem durchschnittlichen Arbeitnehmer der
Altersgruppe 57 bis 64 war die monatliche Übergangswahrscheinlichkeit sogar um etwa
120 Prozent höher, als ohne Reform zu erwarten gewesen wäre. Im Nachreform-Zeitraum
bis Ende 2007 sanken die monatlichen Eintrittsraten Älterer in Arbeitslosigkeit deutlich ab;
sie lagen bei den 57-64 Jährigen um gut 20 Prozent niedriger als ohne Reform. Ein Teil
der geringeren Eintritte im Nachreform-Zeitraum dürfte darauf zurückzuführen sein, dass
Übergänge in die Monate vor der Reform vorgezogen wurden. Da der Gesetzgeber die
Bezugshöchstdauern bereits Anfang 2008 teils wieder verlängerte, lässt sich der exakte
langfristige Reformeffekt leider nicht identifizieren.
JEL classification: J63, J65
Keywords: unemployment incidence, policy evaluation, administrative dataunem-
ployment incidence, policy evaluation, administrative data
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1 Introduction
Economic theory suggests that unemployment benefits (UB) reduce incentives to work
(Moffitt and Nicholson, 1982; Mortensen, 1970). The effect of UB on labour market out-
comes might be particularly strong for older individuals, because workers as well as firms
account for expected streams of unemployment benefits when determining the optimal tim-
ing of (early) retirement (Hutchens, 1999; Stock and Wise, 1990). This paper investigates
empirically how labour market institutions, in particular the system of unemployment com-
pensation and its use as a pathway into early retirement, affect transitions out of employ-
ment into unemployment. We analyse the effects of important legislative changes, which
strongly modified the out-of-work options for older individuals: During 2006, Germany has
seen a radical shortening of unemployment benefit entitlement periods for the elderly. Our
paper presents first results on the effects of this highly debated policy change on individual
labour market outcomes.
From the 1980s until 2006, the German unemployment benefit system guaranteed constant
and high compensation streams (up to 32 months) for elderly workers. It thus provided a
popular bridge between the exit out of regular employment and the entry into old age pen-
sion. Unemployment incidence was high among older workers with long tenure, and their
labour force participation rate was also exceptionally low (OECD, 2003). In the mid 1990s,
unemployment rates for the elderly peaked at about 20–25% and the situation became
more and more financially untenable. Since the second half of the 1990s, several reforms
reduced the generosity of the unemployment compensation and the pension system, with
the aim to postpone workers’ exit out of employment and their entry into retirement. While
changes were rather moderate until the year 2002, the pace of reforms considerably in-
creased in the period 2003–2006. A key element of these policy reforms was the reduction
in maximum entitlement lengths for unemployment benefits, which became effective in
February 2006.
This paper presents a first empirical analysis of the effects of the 2006 reform on individ-
ual unemployment incidence. The reform affected only older age groups and can thus
be interpreted as a natural experiment. This allows us to identify the reform effects us-
ing a difference-in-differences approach. We obtain strong evidence that unemployment
incidence considerably declined in response to the reform. Our findings confirm previous
empirical results for earlier policy changes in Germany and Finland (e.g. Fitzenberger and
Wilke, 2010; Kyyrä and Wilke, 2007). Moreover, we find a considerable anticipation effect
just before the reform that led to a peak in the inflow to unemployment during the win-
ter 2005/2006. The size of this effect is surprising, as legal regulations were designed
to prevent exactly this anticipation effect. Thus, our results suggest that legislation was
not able to fully absorb economic incentives to exploit the old system as far as possible.
Due to anticipation of the reform and the short period until the next reform took place in
early 2008, our analysis cannot exactly identify the longer-term (steady-state) reform effect.
Nevertheless, our results suggest that the reform was successful by sealing an important
leak in the German unemployment insurance system, as the decrease in unemployment
incidence after the reform clearly offsets the anticipation effect.
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The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives a short review of the theoretical and
empirical literature, while Section 3 describes the institutional setup in more detail. Section
4 introduces the data and Section 5 presents estimation results. Based on these estimates,
Section 6 provides a fiscal benefit analysis of the reform from the viewpoint of the Federal
Employment Agency. The last section provides a concluding discussion.
2 Theory and Literature Review
Economic theory suggests that less generous unemployment compensation makes the
state of unemployment less attractive. The competitive labour supply model as well as the
basic job search model (Moffitt and Nicholson, 1982, Mortensen, 1970, see also Cahuc and
Zylberberg, 2004, Chap. 1 and 3) show that reservation wages increase with the generosity
of unemployment benefits. As labour market institutions do not operate in isolation (e.g.
Boeri and van Ours, 2008: Chap. 13), we have to take into account the interplay between
the system of unemployment benefits, retirement programs, and employment protection.
Workers as well as firms optimise their expected present value of future utility or profit,
respectively. A worker will quit once utility from retirement exceeds utility from remaining
employed. In a simple model of the worker’s optimisation decision, it can be shown that
postponing retirement increases income over the remaining life period, while time to derive
utility from being retired decreases; thus that there must be some optimal retirement age
(e.g. Boeri and van Ours, 2008: Chap. 6). Taking into account uncertainty over future in-
come streams, Stock and Wise (1990) developed an option value model of the (irreversible)
retirement decision, where the retirement decision is reassessed every period when new
information on future earnings arrives. Several recent papers presented dynamic program-
ming models of the retirement decision and presented empirical applications (e.g. Hakola
and Määtänen, 2009; Karlstrom et al., 2004). In the context described by us in more detail
in Section 3, achievable consumption and leisure paths are derived not only from expected
future earnings and retirement pensions, but also from achievable streams of unemploy-
ment benefits.
However, firms will often be interested in a separation before a worker’s optimal retirement
age (or the mandatory retirement age) has been reached. Boeri and van Ours (2008:
Chap. 6.3.2) discuss the relationship between age and productivity and conclude that the
objective relationship is difficult to establish (results from the literature are ambiguous);
nonetheless, employers seem to have strong opinions about a decreasing productivity of
workers with age. If dismissals are not enforceable due to employment protection (e.g.
Jahn, 2009), or unwarranted due to implicit contracts or fairness considerations (e.g. Ger-
lach et al., 2008), both parties may negotiate an agreement, often accompanied by some
kind of compensation paid by the firm to the worker. Bentolila and Bertola (1990) devel-
oped a model of a firm’s optimal employment policy in the presence of hiring and firing
costs and showed that a firm reduces its labour force, if the expected present values of
further employment are lower than firing costs. Hutchens (1999) presented a model where
the firm and its workers negotiate a three-period contract over wages, private pensions,
and employment probabilities. While the worker is employed during the first and retired
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during the third period, his employment probability during the second period is a function of
his productivity at work and at home. In this context, the availability of second-period social
security benefits would raise the income of second-period retirees and thereby reduce a
firm’s costs to reach a mutual agreement on second period retirement.
There is a broad empirical literature on the effect of changes in the unemployment com-
pensation system on unemployment duration (e.g. for recent studies Addison and Por-
tugal, 2008; Lalive et al., 2006; Lalive, 2007, 2008; Lee and Wilke, 2009; Müller et al.,
2007). Fewer studies analyse—as we do—the impact of such changes on unemployment
incidence. Empirical evidence relies predominantly on difference-in-differences estimators
(DiD), exploiting reforms in the length of unemployment benefit entitlements that affected
different age groups differently. For Germany, a number of papers have investigated the
reforms of the 1980s and 1990s. Fitzenberger and Wilke (2010) compared unemployment
entries and unemployment duration before and after a UB reform that took place in the
1980s and extended benefit durations for the elderly unemployed significantly. Whereas
the reform had only a small effect on unemployment between jobs, it increased entries into
permanent non-employment for elderly workers. Müller et al. (2007) showed that increasing
age thresholds for maximum eligibility during 1997 reduced the unemployment incidence
and in particular early retirement. Hanel (2008) approached the problem from the viewpoint
of an introduction of permanent benefit reductions for early retirees that was enacted also
during 1997. She found that this reduction led to a postponement of retirement entries by
about fifteen months and a delay of employment exits by about nine months. Empirical
evidence for other countries obtained similar results. For Austria, Winter-Ebmer (2003)
analysed the quasi-experimental situation arising from a large extension of benefit duration
in certain Austrian regions. He showed that unemployment entry rose considerably as a
result of the new law. For Finland, Kyyrä and Wilke (2007) found that increasing the age
threshold from which UB could be utilised as an “unemployment tunnel” into early retire-
ment decreased unemployment entries of the affected age group.
3 The 2006 Reform of Unemployment Benefits
The German unemployment compensation system consists of two main elements. First,
entitled contributors receive UB (Arbeitslosengeld 1) by the unemployment insurance for
a limited time period; its amount depends on former wages. Second, needy unemployed
job-seekers and their household members are entitled to means-tested and tax-financed
unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosengeld 2, UA) since 2005. Contrary to the period be-
fore 2005, its amount does not depend on former wages. The Federal Employment Agency
(Bundesagentur fuer Arbeit, BA) in Nuremberg is the official government body that admin-
istrates the unemployment insurance according to the Social Security Code (Sozialgeset-
zbuch, SGB). In order to qualify for UB, workers or employees need to have been in regular
employment at least 12 months during the past three years until 2005, and during the past
two years since 2006. This generates at least 6 months of UB entitlements, while the max-
imum duration depends on the calendar time period and on the length of the qualifying
employment period. Until the end of 2007, unemployed persons of at least age 58 had
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the opportunity to withdraw from job search (and registered unemployment), while still re-
ceiving UB (see Appendix A). Even though workers and firms fund German unemployment
insurance, there is no comparable experience rating system as in the US. Thus, lay-offs do
not increase social security contribution rates of firms.
The maximum entitlement length for UB in Germany was subject to several changes since
the 1980s. While it was 12 months independent of age until the mid 1980s, it was extended
to up to 32 months for those aged at least 54. In 1997, the age threshold for extended en-
titlement lengths was raised by a few years, such that the minimum age for 32 months of
entitlement increased to 57. This regime was valid until February 2006, when entitlement
lengths were substantially shortened to a maximum duration of 18 months (see also Ta-
ble 1); maximum entitlement lengths for older individuals diminished by up to 14 months for
those aged 52–54 and aged >56. However, the variation in actual UB entitlement lengths
did not necessarily change payment streams for low-income earners (see Appendix A).
The shortening was one of the key elements in the series of the so called “Hartz-Reforms”
of the coalition government by Social Democrats and the Green Party, which were enacted
during the period 2003–2006.
This paper analyses the effects of the aforementioned 2006 UB reform on the unemploy-
ment incidence of entitled older individuals. Because entitlements for younger individuals
were not affected, the policy change involved a natural experiment, with well defined con-
trol and treatment groups. Furthermore, the 2006 reform affected all individuals who lost
their job after the 31st of January 2006, while the stock of UB claimants was unaffected.
Therefore, the design of this policy change set economic incentives to advance planned
dismissals to an earlier date. As it was unpopular with large parts of the voting population,
the successive government (grand coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats)
withdrew the 2006 reform to a large extent in 2008, by re-extending the UB entitlement
lengths to up to 24 months. This new regime was applied not only to new entries into
unemployment, but also to those unemployed at that point of time. Our empirical analy-
sis focuses on the 2006 reform; comprehensive individual data for the period after 2007
are not available yet. Nonetheless, labour market outcomes in late 2007 may have been
already affected due to anticipation of the 2008 reform.
Two other policy changes were enacted at the beginning of 2006. First, as has been men-
tioned above, the qualification period for unemployment benefits has been reduced for
all workers. Second, since 2006, a previously granted tax-free allowance for severance
pay (11,000 Euro) has been abolished. Because we would expect severance payments
to be larger for older workers with longer tenure, this modification has potentially rein-
forced the effects of the UB reform. Due to a lack of data on severance payments we are
unfortunately, not able to separate between these two effects. However, the financial con-
sequences of changes in taxation might be bypassed if non-cash benefits can be offered
instead.
It is well known that the extension in UB entitlement lengths during the 1980s has led to
a sharp increase in the incidence of unemployment for older workers (Fitzenberger and
Wilke, 2010). Workers of age 57 and older could utilise the long entitlement length for
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Table 1: The 2006 reform of maximum entitlement length for UB in Germany.
maximum UB entitlement length in months
age group until 1/2006 2/2006 to 12/2007 reduction
<45 12 12 0
45–46 18 12 6
47–51 22 12 10
52–54 26 12 14
55–56 26 18 8
>56 32 18 14
UB as a bridge between employment and old age pensions. In 1997, this form of early
retirement became more difficult as not only the unemployment insurance system, but
also the pension system underwent several important changes (see Appendix A). Pension
reforms were, however, implemented gradually and over very long transitions periods. Thus
their effects should not interfere—or at least not interfere strongly—with the effects of the
(discontinuous) UB reform analysed by us.
Furthermore, several legal requirements could partly block pathways into early retirement.
First, dismissal protection for older workers with long tenure is rather strong (see Ap-
pendix A). In particular, employment relationships of long-tenured workers in large firms
are likely to be sensitive to changes in the unemployment benefit system. Jahn (2009)
points out that it is nearly impossible for larger firms in Germany to dismiss older workers
with long tenure due to social criteria; thus they have to “buy out” older workers by means
of severance pay. Such separations are particularly costly and thus, large firms would
be particularly likely to restrain from early retirement offers after a reduction in expected
streams of unemployment compensation. Second, from the end of 2003 up to the 2006
reform, firms (except for small firms) had to partly or fully refund UB transfers for dismissed
older workers with longer tenure (§147a SGB III); the underlying idea was to prevent an-
ticipation effects of the reform. There are, however, important exceptions for firms and
workers, which may offer opportunities to bypass the law. In our empirical analysis, we are
also able to check whether the implementation of this law has been successful in the sense
that it fully deterred anticipation effects of the shortened benefit duration. Third, employees
who voluntarily quit their job suffer a cut-off period without UB receipt that shortens the
remaining period of UB receipt. The length of the period was increased several times since
the 1980s and has amounted to 12 weeks during the time period under investigation (§144
SGB III).
Based on the design of the 2006 reform and our economic reasoning in Section 2, we
formulate the following three hypotheses, which we will analyse in our empirical analysis:
The reduction in unemployment incidence for older workers depends on the strength
of the treatment. We therefore expect the largest drop in unemployment entries for
the aged 52–54 and aged >56.
The reform effect is larger for older employees with long tenure in large firms. Larger
firms cannot easily dismiss older workers with long tenure due to social criteria and
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have to buy them out. Therefore, they have to offer higher severance payments (cash
and other benefits) and use unemployment benefits as a subsidy to reach a mutual
agreement.
There is a sharp increase in unemployment incidence briefly before the reform due
to anticipation behaviour.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
For our empirical analysis, we use the Integrated Employment Biographies (IEB) of the
Institute for Employment Research (IAB) which is a merged administrative data set. These
data contain daily spell information about employment periods subject to social security
contributions (excludes self employment and life time civil servants), job seeking periods,
participation in active labour market programmes, and UB/UA claim periods1. For more
details on these data see Oberschachtsiek et al. (2009). Our sample covers the period
2000 to 2007, whereas employment and benefit claim spells are available since 1993. Our
sample is a 2% random sample of employees born before 1970. For our empirical analysis,
we organise the data in form of a monthly panel of workers. We restrict our sample to
individuals aged 40–64, who (would have) had the maximum UB entitlement lengths under
the pre-reform regime. Because special regulations apply to seasonal unemployment in
the construction sector, we exclude it from the following analysis.
Figure 1: Age-specific UB recipient rates from January 2003 to December 2007 based on
UB claimants and workforce with maximum entitlements only. Source: IEB, own results.
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1 The data do not distinguish between employee- and employer-initiated separations. Additional calculations
based on the German Socio-Economic Panel suggest that the share of employee-initiated separations
amounts to less than 10 percent for persons aged 40 and older.
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Age-specific unemployment rates in Germany are heavily driven by changes in the defi-
nition of unemployment due to modifications of the aged 58+ rules in 2003 and in 2008
(Appendix A). Therefore, we present age group specific rates of UB claimants with maxi-
mum entitlement lengths (cf. Table 1) as a share of the eligible population instead. Figure 1
shows that there has been a general increase in UB claimant rates until the end of 2004;
rates were mainly stable during 2005 and decreasing after 2005. These general develop-
ments can be explained by increasingly favourable business conditions in the latter years.
Figure 1 also suggests that the gap between claimant rates for older and prime age un-
employed increased within the less favourable business environment until 2004, and that
it decreased during the boom period (2006–2007). Furthermore, we observe a particu-
larly strong decline in the UB claimant rates after the reform in February 2006. Moreover,
there are considerable peaks in the UB claimant rates of aged 57–64 and 52–54, the two
most affected groups by the UB reform, in late 2005 and early 2006. As there are none
or much smaller increases for other age groups, this provides first empirical evidence for
anticipation behaviour before the reform. While the disproportional changes in the rates
provide some descriptive evidence for a reform effect, it is difficult to establish a clear link
to unemployment incidence as the rates are also affected by the stock of unemployed or
UB claimants and by unemployment duration. In our econometric analysis, we focus on
changes in unemployment incidence.
Because we analyse a reform of the UB system, we restrict our sample to individuals who
were eligible for UB when becoming unemployed. Thus, in our empirical analysis, we
define a transition to unemployment as a transition from employment subject to social se-
curity contributions to claiming UB (Arbeitslosengeld 1)2. Figure 2 displays the probability
of becoming unemployed by age and year3. The unemployment incidence is computed for
workers who are eligible to the maximum unemployment benefit according to Table 1 and
became unemployed during the current year. Before the UB reform, those who were 57
and older at the beginning of their unemployment period were eligible for 32 months, i.e.
more than 2.5 years of UB. This induced a higher transition rate to unemployment, which
is indicated by a jump in the graph at the age of 57. The incidence peaked at an age of
60 and then declined for older persons, as other ways into early retirement became more
attractive. Just before the 2006 reform, unemployment incidence strongly increased for
those aged 57+. After January 2006—when UB entitlement lengths were reduced by more
than 50% for the aged 57+—unemployment incidence peak at an age of 63.
2 Due to cut-off periods or temporary drop outs, for example, UB claim spells do not always begin at the end
of the previous employment spell. In these cases, it is not observable from the data whether there is an
immediate transition to unemployment or a temporary inactivity period. As the number of these cases is
rather small in our sample, our empirical results are robust with respect to the maximum allowed gap. We
checked this for gaps of up to six months. Our following empirical results are obtained by allowing for gaps
of up to three months between the end date of an employment spell and the start date of a subsequent UB
claim spell.
3 More specifically, the probability of becoming unemployed in year t for a years old workers is computed as
1−
12∏
m=1
[
1− pa,`,m
]
,
where pa,`,m is the monthly layoff rate among workers aged a for month m of year `, which is defined as
the ratio of workers with eligibility for the maximum entitlement length becoming unemployed during month
m to otherwise equal workers who were still employed at the end of month m.
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Figure 2: Annual transition rates from employment to unemployment by age and year.
Source: IEB, own results.
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Figure 3 shows monthly transition rates to unemployment during a certain month for differ-
ent age groups. Transitions occur more frequently at the end of the year or quarter, which
leads to peaks in the incidence. This pattern is more apparent for the oldest age group
57+. Furthermore, there is a much higher peak at the end of 2005 for the age group 57+
and also—but less prominent—for the other age groups. Similar to Figure 2, this indicates
the presence of an anticipation effect just before the UB reform from November 2005 until
January 2006. Moreover, unemployment incidence for the oldest age group drops from
about 0.005 to slightly above 0.0025 after the UB reform, while the decline for the other
age groups is much smaller.
As described in Section 3, there are several laws that are supposed to prevent early re-
tirement at the expense of the unemployment insurance. These include cut-off periods for
unemployed who voluntarily quit their job; since 2003, large firms are obliged to refund
unemployment benefits for dismissed older workers with more than 10 years of tenure.
However, a brief study of the official statistics of the Federal Employment Agency showed
that the numbers of such cases are rather low: In April 2006, the stock of unemploy-
ment benefit recipients of age 55 and older for whom unemployment benefits had to be
refunded by the firm peaked at 5,300 cases (the average stock 2005–2006 amounted to
about 430,000 persons). The number of cut-off individuals within the same age group due
to quitting peaked in February 2006 at about 2,300 entries, nearly doubling the average
number of cut-off cases (average monthly entries in unemployment 2005–2006 amounted
to about 18,000). While we cannot say anything about the ex-ante (threat) effects of these
regulations, we conclude that they have been applied ex-post only in comparatively few
cases and were not able to entirely eliminate anticipation behaviour just before the reform.
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Figure 3: Monthly unemployment incidence by time, year and age group. Source: IEB,
own results.
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5 Econometric Analysis
The descriptive analysis has already provided first insights how the UB reform in 2006 af-
fected the unemployment experiences of older employees with long UB entitlement lengths.
In order to obtain an estimate of the reform effect on unemployment incidence, we employ
a difference-in-differences (DiD) design with well defined pre- and post-reform periods and
treatment and control groups. DiD estimators are a standard approach to evaluate policy
changes that affect different groups of individuals differently4. The identifying assumption
is that group-level omitted variables can be captured by group-level fixed effects (e.g. An-
grist and Pischke, 2009: Chap. 5.2), in other words that trends in unemployment incidence
would have been the same for different age groups in the absence of treatment.
Our analysis also takes into account anticipation behaviour just before the reform. If antici-
pation takes place, short- and long-term effects of the reform do not have to coincide. While
the short-term effect can be directly estimated, the DiD estimator may be a biased estimator
of long-term effects: by advancing dismissals from the post-reform period to the pre-reform
period, unemployment incidence decreases—for a limited period after the reform—more
strongly than in absence of anticipation. Unfortunately, the 23 months post-reform period
is not long enough to resolve this issue, which likely induces our DiD estimator to over-
estimate the magnitude of the long-term effect. Furthermore, the removal of a tax-free
allowance for severance pay (see Section 3) at the beginning of 2006 may also affect our
estimates.
We model the conditional probability that an employed individual becomes unemployed
during the period 2003 to 2007 as
Pr[yit = 1|xit] = exp[xitβ)]1 + exp[xitβ] , (1)
where xit represents row it of the design matrix for d (dummy coded) variables and the
constant. The matrix has k columns; β is a k vector of unknown coefficients. We use the
standard maximum likelihood estimator for logit models to estimate model 1 for four differ-
ent specifications (Model O, A, B and C). The vector of explanatory variables xit includes
information on worker’s socio-demographic characteristics and work history, firm and re-
gion characteristics as well as a number of time dummies. Table 2 summarises the four
models, which differ only in the regressor sets5. The DiD estimator is implemented in Model
B through interactions of age group variables and the post-reform dummy, while Model C
includes also interactions between age group variables and the anticipation period.
We first estimate separate logit models for the years 2003 to 2007 (Model O) with age
40 as reference age. Figure 4 presents the resulting age effects in terms of odds ratios.
4 Another popular approach to investigate the effects of UB entitlement lengths is by means of a regression
discontinuity design (RDD, e.g. Angrist and Pischke, 2009: Chap. 6). However, RDD is typically not applied
to the analysis of policy changes, but rather to estimate the effects of discontinuities in benefit receipt by age
under the same regime (e.g. Lalive, 2007, 2008). Furthermore, RDD requires a measurable discontinuity,
which identifies the effect of the policy change (Hahn et al., 2001). Anticipation enlarges this discontinuity;
thus reform and anticipation effects cannot be disentangled.
5 More detailed information on the regressors is given in Table 7 (Appendix B).
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Table 2: Description of models O, A, B, and C
model description
O stratified by year
A year dummies
B basic DiD estimator
C DiD estimator with anticipation
variable description in model
end of year, end of quarter calender time dummies O,A,B,C
year dummies further calender time dummies A,B,C
female, UB received, high wage, tenure >4 years,
firm size >500, employed since 1993, East
Germany
covariates O,A,B,C
unskilled, university degree education dummies (reference:
skilled worker)
O,A,B,C
food, trade & services, semi-public services, public
administration
industry dummies (reference:
manufacturing)
O,A,B,C
age dummies (41, .., 64) age (reference: 40) O
age group dummies age groups (reference: 40–44) A,B,C
post-reform time dummy for post-reform period
(since February 2006), base effect
B,C
age group / post-reform interaction dummies reform effect dummies B,C
anticipation period time dummy for anticipation period
(November 2005 until January 2006)
C
age group / anticipation period interaction
dummies
anticipation effect dummies C
Figure 4: Odds ratios of becoming unemployed from logit models compared with a refer-
ence worker aged 40 (Model O). Source: IEB, own results.
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Table 3: Logit estimates of unemployment incidence
variable Model A Model B Model C
const -4.642*** -4.665*** -4.641***
female -0.218*** -0.217*** -0.218***
UB received since 1993 0.819*** 0.821*** 0.820***
high wage -0.785*** -0.785*** -0.785***
employment length >4 years -1.347*** -1.346*** -1.346***
end of quarter 0.254*** 0.265*** 0.271***
end of year 0.784*** 0.784*** 0.740***
firm size >500 -0.542*** -0.542*** -0.542***
unskilled 0.119*** 0.120*** 0.120***
university degree -0.092*** -0.093*** -0.092***
employed since 1993 0.030** 0.028** 0.029**
East Germany 0.341*** 0.342*** 0.342***
food 0.529*** 0.529*** 0.530***
trade & services 0.168*** 0.168*** 0.168***
semi-public services -0.304*** -0.303*** -0.304***
public administration -0.642*** -0.641*** -0.642***
age group 45–46 -0.011 -0.005 -0.013
age group 47–51 0.046*** 0.051*** 0.040***
age group 52–54 0.122*** 0.155*** 0.127***
age group 55–56 0.308*** 0.336*** 0.306***
age group 57–64 0.701*** 0.766*** 0.704***
2002 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.069***
2003 -0.022* -0.022* -0.022*
2004 -0.148*** -0.148*** -0.148***
2005 -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.282***
2006 -0.529*** 0.066** -0.232***
2007 -0.486*** 0.170*** -0.129***
post-reform -0.574*** -0.294***
age group 45–46 × post-reform -0.029 -0.021
age group 47–51 × post-reform -0.022 -0.011
age group 52–54 × post-reform -0.155*** -0.127***
age group 55–56 × post-reform -0.129*** -0.099***
age group 57–64 × post-reform -0.315*** -0.253***
anticipation 0.002
age group 45–46 × anticipation 0.152***
age group 47–51 × anticipation 0.183***
age group 52–54 × anticipation 0.424***
age group 55–56 × anticipation 0.429***
age group 57–64 × anticipation 0.784***
# observations 20 408 640 20 408 640 20 408 640
McFaddens pseudo-R2 0.119 0.120 0.120
# individuals 389 235 389 235 389 235
note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
The figure suggests that there are three relevant age intervals. The first ranges from 40
to about 50, where there is no difference in the odds ratios in all years between the age
groups. From age 51 to 56, there is a monotone and parallel increase in odds ratios for all
years. The third interval includes those aged 57+, and it is characterised by larger odds
ratios for all years. While pre- and post-reform years form rather homogenous groups,
the year 2005 is an outlier with considerably higher odds ratios. They are mainly driven
by the anticipation effect of individuals who became unemployed between November and
December 2005 (see also Figure 3). Comparing the pre-reform years 2003 and 2004
to the post-reform years 2006 and 2007, we clearly see a downward shift in the interval
57–61 years. This provides further evidence for considerable changes in unemployment
incidence, because results in Figure 4 now control for different compositions of individuals.
Based on these results and given the differences in treatment intensity for age groups
(Table 1), we choose the aged 40–44 as the reference group for the pooled regression
analysis in Models A–C. Based on Figures 3 and 4, we choose November 2005 to January
IAB-Discussion Paper 25/2009 16
2006 as the anticipation period.
As a next step, we estimate Model A, which is a basic reference model with calender year
dummies. Table 3 suggests that older employees have a much greater risk of becoming
unemployed than individuals aged 40–44. Moreover, it suggests a strongly decreasing un-
employment incidence over the course of the years. In particular, there is a downward shift
after the year 2005. As this model is not able to separate business cycle effects from ef-
fects due to changes in the institutional setup, we next estimate a model that distinguishes
between pre- and post-reform regimes for the different age groups (Model B). The basic
DiD estimates suggest that the age groups 52–54, 55–56 and 57–64 have a lower transi-
tion rate into unemployment after the UB reform. The magnitude of the estimated effect
is greater for groups with larger treatment intensity. In particular, the effect appears to be
large for the oldest age group (although logit coefficients do not have a direct interpreta-
tion). As the presence of anticipation behaviour may directly affect the pre-reform period,
we also estimate a model with pre-, anticipation- and post-reform period (Model C). The
DiD estimates confirm the results of the descriptive analysis that there is a significant antic-
ipation effect before the reform. Mainly the oldest age groups are affected by anticipation.
For the other model coefficients, we observe a high degree of stability over the three model
specifications, which is mainly attributed to the large number of observations and the low
degree of statistical association with the DiD related variables. We have also estimated
several other variants of Model C, which allow for additional variation due to the institu-
tional changes in 2003 (refunding of UB by firms), 2005 (reform of UA) and end of 2007
(subsequent reform of UB), but did not find sizable effects. In particular, the presented
results are stable with respect to these model variations.
Table 4: Estimated marginal effects (me) and relative marginal effects (rme)†.
age Model B Model C
period group me rme me rme
pre-reform 45–46 -0.00002 -0.00006
47–51 0.00022*** 0.00017***
52–54 0.00072*** 0.00058***
55–56 0.00170*** 0.00152***
56–64 0.00453*** 0.00402***
anticipation basis 0.00001 0.16%
45–46 0.00071*** 16.32%
47–51 0.00087*** 19.92%
52–54 0.00227*** 52.41%
55–56 0.00231*** 53.06%
56–64 0.00505*** 117.73%
post-reform basis -0.00222*** -43.57% -0.00119*** -25.36%
45–46 -0.00013 -2.86% -0.00009 -2.13%
47–51 -0.00009 -2.15% -0.00005 -1.09%
52–54 -0.00063*** -14.31% -0.00052*** -11.85%
55–56 -0.00053*** -12.04% -0.00041*** -9.37%
56–64 -0.00120*** -26.95% -0.00099*** -22.25%
note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
† relative to an average reference worker with the same age under the pre-reform regime
As logit coefficients do not have a direct interpretation, it is of greater interest to express
estimation results in terms of marginal changes in unemployment incidence. The marginal
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Table 5: DiD estimators for samples stratified by firm size and length of previous employ-
ment (Model C).
smaller firms larger firms
age shorter employment longer employment shorter employment longer employment
group me rme me rme me rme me rme
post-reform
45–46 -0.00083 -4.91% -0.00006 -2.14% 0.00121 19.54% 0.00005 -5.01%
47–51 -0.00064 -3.76% 0.00002 -0.55% 0.00041 6.52% -0.00009 -10.22%
52–54 -0.00321*** -18.92% -0.00029*** -9.99% -0.00013 -2.03% -0.00003 -3.40%
55–56 -0.00102 -6.06% -0.00022 -7.79% -0.00064 -10.16% -0.00042*** -45.02%
56–64 -0.00197*** -11.26% -0.00082*** -28.30% -0.00088 -13.98% -0.00050*** -51.55%
# observations 2 732 024 12 402 117 636 951 4 637 548
pseudo-R2 0.0578 0.051 0.0932 0.0685
# individuals 95 612 199 935 18 751 74 937
For ease of presentation we do not display the other coefficients of Model C.
effect of a dummy variable d is defined by
me(d) = Ex
(
[Pr[yit|u(xit, d)]− [Pr[yit|l(xit, d)]
)
, (2)
where u(xit, d) = (xit,1, . . . , xit,d−1, 1, xit,d+1, . . . , xit,k), i.e. function u(xit, d) replaces
the value at position d in vector xit with one. l(·, ·) operates in the same way but puts in
a zero.6 Furthermore, the magnitude of the marginal effect depends in our framework on
the longitudinal frequency (daily, monthly, yearly etc.), and the probabilities and marginal
effects on a monthly level are rather small. For this reason, we also report relative marginal
effects (rme), which is the marginal effect relative to an average reference individual with
the same age in the pre-reform period, i.e.
rme(d) =
me(d)
Ex
(
[Pr[yit|x¨it])
. (3)
x¨it is the covariates vector with zeroed reform effect dummies (interactions between age
and post-reform). The rme is more informative as it is invariant with respect to panel fre-
quency.
The resulting marginal effects and relative marginal effects for Models B and C are reported
in Table 4. As has already been mentioned, the strongest effect is observed for the oldest
age group. For this group, unemployed incidence is reduced by 0.1 percentage points,
which corresponds to a 22.25% lower incidence in the post-reform period compared to
the pre-reform risk. Similarly, the incidence for the age group 52–54 is reduced by 0.05
percentage points or 11.85%, while the partial anticipation effect for the oldest age group
is 0.505 percentage points or an increase by 117%. The anticipation effect is in the range of
50% for the aged 52–56. These numbers suggest clear evidence for a strong anticipation
of the UB reform.
Even though we have already found strong empirical support for the average reform effect
being related to the treatment intensity and for the presence of a considerable anticipa-
6 Cf. Ai and Norton (2003) and e.g. Puhani (2008) for a discussion on marginal effects of interaction terms
in nonlinear models. We also computed effects according to Ai and Norton, which were similar to the
presented results.
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tion of the reform, our second hypothesis that larger firms more likely dismiss their oldest
employees with long tenure remains to be analysed. To do so, we estimate Model C by
stratifying the estimation sample with respect to firm size and employment length before
unemployment (as a proxy for tenure). The resulting DiD estimators are given in Table 57. It
is remarkable that smaller firms (less than 500 employees) react in relation to the treatment
intensity. In contrast, larger firms merely utilised extended benefit entitlements to generally
shed employees aged 55 and older; the drop in unemployment incidence is related to age
rather than treatment intensity. As dismissal protection makes it nearly impossible for large
firms to dismiss older workers with long tenure due to social criteria, the reform made it
more expensive to buy out older workers. Thus the result is in line with our theoretical
predictions derived with the theoretical and institutional background sketched in Sections 2
and 3.
We also analysed the role of the previous wage (as another indicator for treatment inten-
sity), but we found only weak evidence for stronger effects in the higher quintiles of the
earnings distributions. For this reason, we do not present these results.
6 Fiscal Benefit Analysis
Our empirical findings suggest that the financial burden for the unemployment insurance
decreased due to the UB reform, partly maybe also due to the change in taxation of sev-
erance pay. Based on our empirical results, we now estimate per-capita-savings for the
unemployment insurance for employees aged 55 and older as well as savings for the en-
tire age cohort. However, the estimates rely on several assumptions: First, we assume
that older individuals fully exhaust their UB entitlements, as they are in fact early retired
and have a very low probability of re-entering employment (Arntz and Wilke, 2009). This
might, however, slightly overestimate the true reform effect. Second, we are interested in
the long-run (or steady-state) fiscal benefits of the reform. We cannot, however, identify
whether anticipation of the reform led to additional dismissals or whether separations were
merely advanced. In the former case, our estimated parameters provide us with the correct
long-run effects, while we overestimate the magnitude of long-run effects in the latter case.
We can therefore only provide bounds for long-term savings.
Generally, the per capita change in UB costs for an employee aged a (expendituresa) with
maximum entitlement lengths for UB is decomposed (see also Kyyrä and Wilke, 2007) as
∆expendituresa = pa∆Ea(b+ s) + ∆paEa(b+ s) + ∆pa∆Ea(b+ s) , (4)
where pa is the probability of becoming unemployed at age a before the reform. Ea(b+ s)
is the expected cost for the unemployment insurance for an unemployed at age a with max-
imum entitlement length for UB before the reform. This consists of unemployment benefit
transfers (b) and the foregone insurance premium (s). pa+∆pa and Ea(b+s)+∆Ea(b+s)
are the corresponding post-reform values. ∆expendituresa is therefore the estimated
7 The full set of estimated coefficients can be obtained by the authors on request. Estimated coefficients of
anticipation effects are not displayed, because they are very similar across regimes.
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Table 6: Estimated monthly changes in financial burden for the unemployment insurance
(based on the post-reform coefficients from Model C)
pa Ea(b+ s), in Euros
Age group 40–44 55–56 57–64 40–44 55–56 57–64
Pre-reform 0.00437702 0.00901464 0.01129875 13 624 33 956 41 675
Post-reform 0.00318492 0.00741134 0.00912115 13 624 23 508 23 442
Change -0.0011921 -0.0016033 -0.0021776 0 -10 448 -18 233
∆pa -0.0004112 -0.0009855 0 -10 448 -18 233
∆pa(anticipation) 0.0023085 0.0050465
Per capita changes (in Euros)
Age group 55–56 57–64
Due to change in expected costs. pa ·∆Ea(b+ s) -73.14 -148.33
Upper bounds
Due to change in incidence. ∆pa · Ea(b+ s) -13.96 -41.07
Cross effect. ∆pa ·∆Ea(b+ s) 4.30 17.97
∆expendituresa -82.80 -171.44
Total cohort changes (in million Euros)
Age group 55–56 57–64
Number of employees in cohort (10/2005) 906 600 1 614 200
Due to change in expected costs -66.307 -239.442
Upper bounds
Due to change in incidence -12.658 -66.296
Cross effect 3.895 29.004
Total savings (lower bound) -66.307 -239.442
Total savings (upper bound) -75.071 -276.733
monthly per capita change in the financial burden for the unemployment insurance, where
our decomposition separates the changes due to the reduction in unemployment incidence
and the reduction due to shorter UB claim periods. We estimate pa from the data (based on
the years 2001–2005). As the level of unemployment benefits (b), we use the age cohort
average, based on wages of employees with maximum UB entitlements; furthermore, we
assume a joint employer-employee unemployment insurance contribution rate (s) of 5%, as
the mean actual contribution rate was close to this value in the period under consideration.
Table 6 shows our resulting estimates. The upper panel of the table reports the per capita
changes in unemployment incidence, expected costs and change in the unemployment
incidence. For a worker of age 55–56, the savings in expected costs amount to about
10,000 Euros, for a worker of age 57–64 to about 18,000 Euros, provided that workers
exhaust their claims. The true change in the incidence level can only be bounded as we
cannot identify whether the anticipation effect was caused by additional dismissals or by an
advance to earlier periods. The upper bound for ∆pa is the DiD estimator of Model C, which
is likely to be greater in magnitude than it would have been in absence of anticipation. The
lower bound is 0, if the entire post-reform effect resulted from an advancing of dismissals.
Similarly, the upper bound for the per capita anticipation costs is 3·∆pa(anticipation)·Ea(b+s)
which is 235 Euros and 631 Euros for the aged 55–56 and 57–64 respectively. The upper
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bound of the total anticipation costs is therefore 1,232 millions Euros.
The middle panel of the table reports estimates for the decomposition (4). The major part
of the total savings results from the reduction in expected costs. Although we provide only
bounds for changes in incidence and the anticipation costs, it is evident form the above
figures that the expected savings exceed the anticipation costs after a few months latest.
Finally, the lower panel of Table 6 reports the bounds for the monthly (steady-state) savings
of the unemployment insurance, given the estimated size of the cohort of employees aged
55–64 with maximum UB entitlement lengths in October 2005. Our numbers suggest that
the long-term burden for the unemployment insurance would have been reduced by (66 +
239) · 12 = 3, 660 up to (75 + 277) · 12 = 4, 224 millions Euros per year. Although the
major part arises for those aged 57–64 (under the assumption that they fully exhaust UB
entitlements), the reduction in the incidence was also likely to be of importance.
Even though the long-term savings would have been rather large, it is important to note
that the actual savings due to the change in expected costs started 18 months after the re-
form (due to anticipation, there was probably even an increase in the actual costs in 2005
and 2006). As the reform was already partly abolished after 23 months, the actual steady
state period covers at most 5 months. Nonetheless, our computations clearly suggest that
the reduction in UB entitlement lengths had important fiscal consequences. The cut in the
entitlement lengths likely explains—apart from improving business conditions and the eco-
nomic upswing—part of the excellent financial situation of the unemployment insurance in
2007 and early 2008, which was generating a massive surplus during this period. Further-
more, our simple computations ignore savings for younger age cohorts and that budgets
of other social insurance branches were likely to be positively affected, too. Of course,
however, longer means tested UA claim periods after exhaustion of UB entitlements have
caused an additional financial burden for taxpayers.
7 Conclusions
Our paper confirms that extended unemployment benefit entitlement lengths provide in-
centives for higher unemployment entries—in particular for older workers. Short benefit
durations make lay-offs more costly for firms and workers, which discourages the use of
unemployment benefits as a pathway into retirement.
It is important to identify the reasons for the low employment rates of older workers in
Germany (Arnds and Bonin, 2003). Whether it is due to the institutional design or due to
discrimination, such knowledge is essential for the design of successful future policies. The
results presented in our paper show that the 2006 reform in Germany was in fact successful
in fixing an important leak in the design of the welfare state and barring the pathway into
retirement through a period of unemployment. The weak labour market performance of
older workers in Germany had therefore been at least partly due to the generous social
security system. However, the German voting population tends to prefer a more extensive
social security system. Using 2006 survey data, Heinemann et al. (2009) showed that only
18 percent of the German population was in favour of cutting unemployment benefits. Thus,
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it is not surprising that benefit entitlement lengths were re-extended to up to 24 months in
2008.
While we found evidence for our main hypotheses and important short-term reform effects,
there are several unresolved difficulties for a more accurate evaluation of the long-term re-
form effects. Other institutional changes—regarding the pension system and the taxation of
severance pay—that have been conducted during the same period might have contributed
to the decline in unemployment entries, too. Furthermore, due to anticipation of the reform,
the DiD approach can be expected to overestimate the magnitude of the long-term reform
effect on unemployment incidence. A longer post-reform would be required to attenuate
this effect. The 2006 reform was, however, already mainly withdrawn at the beginning of
2008. This—as well as the fact that employment data are not available for the time period
after 2007 yet—hampers also an investigation of reform effects on unemployment dura-
tions and exits from unemployment in different labour market states. For these reasons, an
analysis of unemployment duration is left for future research, which will at least be able to
benefit from longer observed unemployment periods after the reform.
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A Institutional Background Supplement
Withdrawal from registered unemployment: An important peculiarity to the German
labour market were regulations for unemployment compensation claimants aged 58 or
older, which made it possible to withdraw from the labour market while still receiving unem-
ployment compensation (§428 SGB III). These inactive unemployment claimants were not
part of registered unemployment any longer. This 58+ rule was extended to elderly without
entitlements for unemployment benefits in May 2003 (§252,8 SGB VI). The 58+ rules were
abolished at the end of 2007. Since 2008, a similar rule was enacted for older unemployed
UA recipients: They are signed-off from registered unemployment if they have not received
a job offer during one year of benefit receipt (§53a SGB II).
Replacement rates: In case of UB, the wage replacement rate amounts to 60–67% of the
previous wage, depending on whether there are dependent children in the household or
not. If the level of UB is not sufficient to meet the household’s needs and the household
have no other means of subsistence, the household is entitled to additional tax funded un-
employment compensation (social benefits until 2004 or unemployment assistance since
2005). Thus UB regulations are practically irrelevant for households with a very low in-
come, even in case of positive entitlements. Furthermore, the change in the transfers
levels at expiration of UB is also determined by household wealth and other household
income. While the level of means-tested UA amounted to 53–60% of the previous wage
until 2004, it became a flat rate in 2005 that equals the level of social benefits. To sum
up, the compensation level for poor and low income households should be almost invariant
across regimes, which is not the case for wealthier households and individuals with high
pre-unemployment wages. Given that our administrative individual data provide only partial
information about the household background, it is difficult to predict the wage replacement
rate of an employed individual in case of unemployment. For this reason, we are not able
to identify the exact treatment intensity in our data.
Reforms of the pension system: Changes in the UB system since the late 1990s were
accompanied by changes in the old age pension system that made early retirement more
difficult. While the minimum retirement age has been given by 65, until 1997 in particular
women and persons that have been unemployed for at least one year had the opportunity
to enter early retirement without pension reductions at age 60. This set incentives for
firms and workers to separate when workers became 57 years and 5 months, exhausting
32 months of unemployment benefits. Since 1997, old age pensions were lowered for
individuals retiring prior to the minimum age of 65 by 0.3 percentage points per month
that retirement entry takes places prior to the age of eligibility for the full pension. During
a transition period (1997–2004), different birth cohorts could retire with a full pension at
different ages; the transition, however, was implemented without discontinuities and over a
long time horizon. Furthermore, from 2006 onwards, the earliest entry age into pension due
to unemployment has been raised from 60 to 63 years. Again, the reform was implemented
without discontinuities and over a transition period (2006–2012). To summarise, it has been
possible since 2005 to build a bridge from UB (with maximum duration) into retirement
without pension reductions starting from an age of 62 and 5 months, and with maximum
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pension reductions (18 percent) still from an age of 57 years and 5 months. Since 2006,
a transition into early retirement could be achieved without pension reductions for those
aged 63 years and 7 months, while the starting age for a transition with pension reductions
depends on the age cohort and gradually increases to 61 years and 7 months (with a latter
pension reduction of 7.2 percent).
Employment protection legislation and severance pay: Since 2004, employment pro-
tection legislation applies to workers employed in firms with more than 10 workers (before:
more than 5 workers) and with a tenure of more than 6 months. Layoffs may only be justi-
fied, if the firm can state a suitable reason for termination; most firms dismiss workers for
economic reasons or offer severance payments. Firms displacing workers for economic
reasons have to rank workers according to the criteria age, tenure, family responsibili-
ties and disability. Furthermore, since 2004, the law specifies the amount of severance
payments if the firm dismisses the worker for economic reasons, to reduce incentives of
dismissed workers to file a lawsuit (the minimum compensation amounts to one half of a
monthly gross wage for each year the worker has been employed by the firm). Generally,
if older employees with long tenure quit before terms of notice of the lay-off have expired
and receive severance pay, UB claims are suspended and delayed by this period (§143a
SGB III). Until 2004, the receipt of severance payments was interpreted as indication of a
voluntary job loss; since then it does not induce a cut-off period if the employee has been
laid off for economic reasons.
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B Additional Tables
Table 7: Variables overview
variable description
female dummy for sex, indicating 1 for females
UB received since 1993 dummy for having received UB since 1993
high wage dummy for earning an upper-two-quintiles wage
tenure >4 years dummy for currently having a tenure of more than four years
end of quarter dummy indicating the end of a quarter
end of year dummy indicating the end of a year
firm size >500 dummy for working in a firm with more than 500 employees (large
firm)
unskilled dummy for being unskilled
university degree dummy for having any university degree
employed since 1993 dummy for being continuously employed since 1993
East Germany dummy for working in the eastern parts of Germany (former GDR)
food, trade & services, semi-
public services, public administra-
tion
dummies indicating the industry, reference is ‘manufacturing’
age group 45–46, . . . , 57–64 dummies for the age groups, reference is 41–44
2002, . . . , 2007 dummies for the years, reference is 2001
post-reform dummy for the post-reform phase, i.e. since 2/2006
age group and post-reform inter-
actions
dummies for the interactions between age groups and post-reform
phase
anticipation phase dummy for the anticipation phase, i.e. 11/2005 to 1/2006
age group and anticipation inter-
actions
dummies for the interactions between age groups and anticipation
phase
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